By John B. Kirkwood, J. B. Kirkwood
As readers have spotted, the final a number of volumes of study in legislations and Economics have consisted of detailed factor volumes. this may proceed. This quantity is likely one of the most sensible. Jack Kirkwood positioned this quantity including modest the aid of me. i feel this can be a superb quantity and count on to satisfy the excessive usual set the following in destiny volumes.
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Additional resources for Antitrust Law and Economics, Volume 21
While it appears, therefore, that Lande’s view commands more support today than Bork’s, there is no consensus. 97 THE ECONOMISTS’ VIEW In contrast, the economics profession as a whole continues to analyze antitrust issues in terms of the traditional measure of economic efficiency. 99 Several papers, however, give special attention to the impact of a practice or order on consumers in the relevant market. 102 Regardless of whether these developments signal a general shift in economists’ conceptions of welfare, they display, at minimum, a heightened sensitivity to what Lande and many other law professors regard as the overarching purpose of the antitrust laws.
While the precise meaning of consumer welfare is still in dispute, this paper finds that the courts seem to be moving toward a resolution. Recent federal decisions appear more likely to equate consumer welfare with the well-being of consumers in the relevant market than with economic efficiency. To the extent these two objectives conflict, protecting purchasers from exploitation, rather than enlarging the total wealth of society, seems to be the preferred goal. At the same time, the other component of the revolution – the use of economic analysis to determine whether consumer welfare is likely to be enhanced or diminished – continues to grow in importance.
114 One especially telling instance occurred when International Salt granted the volume discount to a wholesaler group in Louisiana that had been spreading its purchases among several salt suppliers. The owner of the group had threatened to consolidate the group’s entire purchases and place them with a supplier other than International. 115 Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust 41 This evidence indicates that large buyers do not have to wield monopsony power to extract non-cost-justified concessions from oligopolistic sellers.